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THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT:
CAN AUSTRALIA PROHIBIT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?
Katy A. King†
Abstract: Both the United States and Australia have federal legislation, the
Defense of Marriage Act1 and the Marriage Amendment Act 2004,2 that defines marriage
as a union between a man and a woman. Australia has an express provision in its
constitution granting Parliament the authority to pass laws on the subject of marriage.
The United States, however, has no such constitutional provision. Consequently,
Australia’s express constitutional provision may lead the High Court of Australia to rule
that the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 is constitutional, which would likely preclude
Australia’s states and territories from passing local same-sex marriage acts. This is
fundamentally different than in the United States, where powers regarding marriage are
reserved to the states. Therefore, even if the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the Defense of
Marriage Act, laws that authorize same-sex marriage remain valid in states such as
Massachusetts.3 Passing a law legalizing same-sex marriage in an Australian state,
however, may force the issue before the High Court. A ruling upholding the
constitutionality of the law may give Parliament the incentive to use its expressly granted
constitutional authority to tighten restrictions on marriage and marriage-like entities even
further. Therefore, same-sex proponents in Australia should approach the issue more
gingerly than same-sex proponents in the United States. Instead of attempting to pass
state same-sex marriage provisions and forcing a decision before the Australian High
Court, supporters of commonwealth or state same-sex marriage laws should indirectly
pressure Parliament to overturn the Marriage Amendment Act. In addition, they should
continue to push for domestic-partnership protections at the state and commonwealth
level.

I.

INTRODUCTION

February 2004 was an exhilarating month for gay and lesbian couples
in both Australia and the United States. On February 12, Mayor Gavin
Newsom of San Francisco, California, authorized the city clerk to begin
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.4 Similarly, on February 15,
approximately three hundred gay and lesbian couples tied the knot in
Melbourne, Australia, in what organizers claimed was the world’s largest
same-sex commitment ceremony.5 On February 22, two thousand people
crammed into San Francisco’s Hyatt Regency for a giant wedding reception
†

Juris doctor expected in 2007, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Peter Nicolas for his guidance on this topic. All errors and omissions are the author’s own.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1738C, 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000).
2
No. 126, sched. 1 (Austl.)
3
See, e.g., Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457,
466 (1998) (discussing, in part, that DOMA did not intend to change state law).
4
182 Days, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2004, at A16.
5
Same-Sex Wedding Fever, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/15/1076779837706.html.
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honoring the thousands of same-sex couples that had been married over the
past eleven days.6
What started as a flurry of hope and an attempt to draw attention to
the lack of legal recognition for same-sex couples7 ended with
disappointment for many. On February 24, President George W. Bush called
for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.8 On
May 27, Prime Minister John Howard introduced legislation into Parliament
to ban same-sex marriage in Australia.9 While on July 15 the U.S. Senate
defeated the Bush administration’s attempt to ban same-sex marriage, on
August 12, the California Supreme Court voided the 3,955 marriages that
had taken place in San Francisco during the previous February and March.10
On August 13, Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament approved legislation
defining marriage as a union of a man and a woman.11
Both the United States and Australia have federal legislation defining
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In 1996, the Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) became law in the United States.12 DOMA both
defines marriage as between only a man and a woman for federal purposes,
and asserts that no state shall be required to recognize same-sex marriages
from other states.13 Similarly, in 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament
passed the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (“Marriage Amendment Act”).
The Marriage Amendment Act inserted language into the Marriage Act 1961
defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman.14 While the plain
language of these laws appears similar, the U.S. Constitution differs from the
Australian Constitution. President Bush desired a constitutional amendment
to ban same-sex marriage at the federal and state levels, whereas Australia’s
constitution already gives Parliament the express authority to pass binding
laws on the topic of marriage. This difference may affect the impact of
federal legislation defining marriage.
The actual effects of these two laws are similar in many ways. In
Australia, states can allow de facto relationships that grant unmarried
couples state benefits equal to those granted married couples; states also
6

See 182 Days, supra note 4.
See Same-Sex Wedding Fever, supra note 5.
See 182 Days, supra note 4.
9
Stand Up for Our Rights, PM Plans to Ban Same Sex Marriage, NEW SOUTH WALES COUNCIL FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES, available at http://www.nswccl.org.au/issues/glbt.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
10
See 182 Days, supra note 4.
11
Coalition, Labor Pass Same-Sex Marriage Ban, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION
ONLINE, Aug. 13, 2004, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200408/s1176303.htm.
12
28 U.S.C. § 1738C, 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000).
13
Id.
14
No. 126, sched. 1 (Austl.)
7
8
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potentially can pass civil-union laws.15 These couples, however, will be
excluded from federal laws that cover superannuation,16 immigration, and
taxation.17 There is debate over whether Australian states, like U.S. states,
have the authority to pass same-sex marriage laws.18 In the United States,
states can authorize same-sex marriage, but those couples are denied federal
benefits to which other couples are entitled.19
Due to differences between the two countries’ constitutions, however,
the strategy that same-sex marriage proponents use to attempt to legalize
same-sex marriage should be different. In the United States, a ruling
upholding the legality of DOMA from the Supreme Court will continue to
limit federal benefits for same-sex couples and the right to have a same-sex
marriage recognized in another state. DOMA does not, and cannot, prevent
states like Massachusetts from legalizing same-sex marriage; the U.S.
Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to pass laws regarding
marriage. On the other hand, because the Australian constitution does
expressly authorize Parliament to pass laws regarding marriage, it is riskier
for proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia to force a decision by the
High Court; a judicial determination that the Marriage Amendment Act is
15
Donna Cooper, For Richer For Poorer, In Sickness and In Health: Should Australia Embrace
Same-Sex Marriage?, AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. Lexis 7, *22 (2005) (discussing Queensland’s
Discrimination Law Amendment Act (2002) (Austl.) that includes same-sex partners in the definition of de
facto partners. Id. In addition, Cooper declares that the “2004 amendments to the Marriage Act occurred at
a time when there had been strong legislative trends throughout Australia, at both Commonwealth and State
and Territory level, to develop to same-sex couples the same rights as married couples in many other areas
of the law.” Id. at *19. In 2006, the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) attempted to pass a civil-union
law. See, e.g., Michael Perry, Australian Territory to Allow Gay Civil Marriages, REUTERS, Mar. 29, 2006,
available
at
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-0329T042531Z_01_SYD21282_RTRUKOC_0_UK-AUSTRALIA-HOMOSEXUAL.xml. ACT proposed a
civil-union law that would have given same-sex couples the same rights in the territory as married couples.
However, the act would not have, affected national laws that govern taxation, superannuation, and health
care. Id. In June 2006, however, the governor-general struck down ACT’s civil-union legislation on the
advice of Prime Minister Howard. No Wedding Bells: John Howard Blocks Canberra’s Gay Marriages,
ECONOMIST, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=
7067408. At the time of publication of this comment, it is unclear what will happen next in the conflict
between the commonwealth and the states and territories.
16
Superannuation in Australia is similar to the United States’ Social Security program. A mandatory
contribution from workers’ wages to a superannuation scheme provides for workers upon retirement. It
also provides for their dependents upon death. Jenny Millbank & Kathy Sant, A Bride in her Every-Day
Clothes: Same Sex Relationship Recognition in NSW, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 181, 213 (2000).
17
Id.
18
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 15 (discussing state bills in Tasmania and New South Wales that, if
passed, purport to legalize same-sex marriage); Rodney Croome, Marching Under the Banner of Marriage,
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, May 11, 2005 (arguing that the Marriage Amendment Act clearly indicates that the
federal marriage law deals only with different-sex marriage, leaving open the door for states to pass noncontradictory same-sex marriage laws that would operate in a different field).
19
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb And Doma: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 85
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997).
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constitutional would allow Parliament to exercise its express constitutional
authority to regulate marriage at both the federal and state levels. This could
result in Australian states being precluded from passing laws authorizing
equality for same-sex couples.
For same-sex marriage proponents in Australia, a ruling upholding the
legality of the Marriage Amendment Act from the High Court would not
only eliminate same-sex marriage at the commonwealth level, but also
eliminate same-sex marriage at the state level. Section 109 of the Australian
Constitution likely prevents individual states and territories from legalizing
same-sex marriage, as commonwealth legislation supersedes any conflicting
state legislation.20 A ruling upholding the commonwealth’s exclusive
jurisdiction on marriage could lead to legislation that even further curtails
equality of same-sex couples. In December 2005, Prime Minister Howard
expressed his views on same-sex partnerships, declaring, “I believe very
strongly that marriage is exclusively a union for life of a man and a woman
to the exclusion of others. That’s the common understanding of marriage in
the Judeo-Christian tradition, and I would be opposed to the recognition of
civil unions.”"21 The views of highly influential politicians such as the
prime minister, in addition to a High Court ruling upholding the prohibition
on same-sex marriage, could lead to an even greater push for legislation
restricting the rights of same-sex couples.
If the Marriage Amendment Act is challenged, some arguments
suggest that the High Court would strike down the act as a violation of the
Australian Constitution. Other arguments suggest, however, that the court
would uphold the legislation.22 Based on this uncertainty, Australians
interested in promoting same-sex marriage should lobby Parliament to
amend the marriage definition and continue working to strengthen state and
commonwealth domestic-partnership laws. Challenging the Marriage
Amendment Act directly through the passage of potentially conflicting state
laws might trigger litigation resulting in an unfavorable judicial
determination by the High Court.
This comment analyzes different approaches to regulating marriage in
the United States and Australia and assesses the similarities and differences
of federal legislation and its effect at the state level. Section II lays out the
20
AUSTL. CONST. § 109. “Inconsistency of laws – When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law
of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
invalid.” Id.
21
Australians Back Same-Sex Civil Unions, ANGUS REID GLOBAL SCAN: POLLS AND RESEARCH.
February 20, 2006, available at http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/
10947.
22
See infra Part III.
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background and history of DOMA in the United States and the Marriage
Amendment Act in Australia. Section III analyzes the likelihood the High
Court of Australia would uphold the Marriage Amendment Act if the act
were attacked on its constitutionality. Section IV argues that if the High
Court upholds the legality of the Marriage Amendment Act, then the High
Court likely also will rule that the law is binding on the states; state samesex legislation will be struck down as conflicting with commonwealth
legislation. Section V proposes that same-sex marriage proponents in
Australia should take a tactically different approach than same-sex marriage
proponents in the United States due to the differences in the constitutions
and the ramifications of an adverse court decision. Instead of pushing for a
state same-sex marriage law that could conflict with the commonwealth law
and trigger a restrictive High Court ruling, proponents of same-sex marriage
in Australia should continue to advocate for civil unions as well as lobby
Parliament and high-powered public officers, such as the prime minister, for
a reversal of the Marriage Amendment Act.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE SCOPE OF DOMA UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
VERSUS THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT
UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION

The scope of DOMA within the United States differs from the scope
of the Marriage Amendment Act in Australia. In the United States, DOMA
applies to marriage only for federal purposes; states retain the power to
regulate marriage for state purposes. In Australia, however, Parliament has
the express constitutional authority to pass laws regulating marriage.23 As a
result, the Marriage Amendment Act may be binding on the states as well as
the commonwealth.
A.

The U.S. Congress Likely Does Not Have the Authority to Expand
DOMA’s Scope to Restrict States’ Ability to Pass Same-Sex Marriage
Laws

In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed DOMA, which has two main
functions. First, DOMA defines the word marriage as a legal union between
only a man and a woman for purposes of determining the meaning of any
Act of Congress.24 Secondly, DOMA gives authority to all states of the
United States to refuse to give effect to any record or proceeding from
23
24

AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxi).
1 U.S.C § 7 (2000).
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another state respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex.25
DOMA does not attempt to define marriage as the union between only a man
and a woman for nonfederal purposes, i.e., it does not attempt to demand
that the states also define marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union.
The recognition that regulation of domestic relations belongs exclusively to
the states shapes the content and structure of family law in the United
States.26 Therefore, in order for the U.S. government to bind states to a
certain definition of marriage, there would likely first need to be a
constitutional amendment either granting Congress the authority to pass such
legislation or, in the alternative, stripping state courts of the power to create
or extend legal status and benefits for same-sex partners.27
1.

The U.S. Congress Has Limited Power to Pass Laws Regulating
Marriage

Although the issue is still debated, the U.S. Congress likely does not
have the authority to mandate the definition of marriage for state purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the “whole subject of the
domestic relations of a husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the states, and not the laws of the United States.”28 On the rare
occasions when state family law has conflicted with a federal statute, the
Supreme Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause29 to
determine whether Congress has “positively required by direct enactment”
that state law be preempted.30 A state family law must do “major damage”
to “clear and substantial” federal interests before the Court will invalidate
it.31

25

28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
27
Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in
Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137 (2004).
28
Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94.
29
U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2. “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” Id.
30
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1904) (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,
77).
31
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). But see
Koppelman, supra note 19, at n.25. Koppelman argues that the Hisquierdo test has never been described
by the Court as a constitutional limitation on Congress, but instead as merely a guide to statutory
construction. The “major damage” prong has been toothless and has had little influence on even the
interpretation of any federal statute. However, if the law’s purpose is illegitimate, “the law is already
invalid.” Id.
26
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No express authority exists under the U.S. Constitution for Congress
to pass laws regulating marriage.32 The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people.33 For example, in striking down the
civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act,34 the Supreme
Court noted that “the Constitution requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local.”35 Reiterating that every law passed by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution,36 the Supreme Court declared that if the Court accepted the
petitioner’s reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce
Clause37 to legislate on gender-motivated violence, then that same rationale
apply to family law issues such as marriage, divorce, and childrearing.38 In
declaring those arenas “areas of traditional state regulation,”39 the Court held
that the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act
exceeded the scope of Congress’ authority to pass legislation.40
Nevertheless, the validity of the assertion that states retain plenary
governmental authority to regulate family matters is not entirely certain.41
Federal laws increasingly regulate family relations.42
Without a
constitutional amendment, however, the Court almost certainly will
determine that powers regarding marriage are reserved to the states.
Proponents of a federal law defining marriage as a union between only a
man and a woman call for a constitutional amendment, rather than mere
legislation.43 In 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the

32

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34
42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
35
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
36
Id. at 607 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution
is written”)).
37
Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress shall have the authority “to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8.
38
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
39
Id. at 615.
40
Id. at 627.
41
See Wardle, supra note 27, at 168-71.
42
Examples of the federalization of family law include regulation of child support, abortion, family
planning and birth control, foster care and adoption, health insurance for dependents, family violence,
family leave policies, and parental rights. Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a
Quest for Policy, 33 FAM. L. Q. 843, 847-48 (1999). See also Norman N. Robbins, The “Feds” Are Still
Coming, 31 MICH. FAM. L.J. 4 (2002).
43
Wardle, supra note 27, at 139. “The choice is clear—either in the next dozen years there will be a
constitutional rule protecting the institution of conjugal marriage, or there will be a constitutional rule
33
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Federal Marriage Amendment in an attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution
to define marriage as the union between only a man and a woman.44 The
same bill was introduced into the Senate the following year.45 While neither
bill has passed, the fact that opponents of same-sex marriage believe they
need to amend the U.S. Constitution strongly suggests that there is no
existing constitutional authority for Congress to pass laws defining marriage
at the state level.
2.

The Scope of DOMA in the United States Does Not Include Mandating
That States Define Marriage as Between a Man and a Woman

Despite the jurisprudence indicating that family arrangements are a
“peculiarly state province,”46 DOMA was passed by the U.S. Congress in
1996.47 DOMA, however, only defines marriage for federal purposes; it
does not attempt to require states to define marriage as between only a man
and a woman.48
DOMA has two parts, “each designed to perform a different
function.”49 One part, 1 U.S.C. § 7, declares that “in determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. . . .”50 The
second part, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, asserts that no state “shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State
. . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated
as a marriage under the laws of such other State. . . .”51 This means that
marriage is defined as between a man and a woman, only for federal
purposes, in the determination of any benefit, privilege, or obligation
attributed to marriage through legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.52 In

forcing all states to create or to recognize—and effectively leading to domestic approval of—same-sex
marriage. The choice is inevitable. There is, and will be, no middle ground.” Id. at 198.
44
H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002). The full text of the proposed bill: “Marriage in the United
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution
of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” Id.
45
S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
46
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966).
47
28 U.S.C. § 1738C, 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000).
48
Id.
49
Mark P. Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Lawrence
Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 421, 421 (2005).
50
1 U.S.C. § 7.
51
28 U.S.C. §1738C.
52
See Strasser, supra note 49, at 421-22, 436-37.
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addition, DOMA allows states to refuse to honor same-sex marriages from
other states, negating any Full Faith and Credit Clause claim for this issue.53
Since the passage of DOMA, many commentators have argued that
the U.S. Supreme Court could (or should) rule that DOMA exceeds
Congress’s power to legislate,54 violates the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, and/or violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution.55
Unless the Supreme Court itself declares DOMA
unconstitutional, however, lower courts will likely continue to uphold its key
provisions.56 As of October 2006, arguments regarding the constitutionality
of DOMA have not been heard at the Supreme Court level.
However, even a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of DOMA would not affect the ability of states to legislate
and enforce same-sex marriage laws within that state. In 2003, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has left
open as a matter of federal law whether states have the authority to bar
same-sex couples from civil marriage.57 Even if the U.S. Constitution would
allow a state to prohibit same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts court
determined in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health58 that its own state
constitution “is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and
equality than the Federal Constitution . . . [and] may demand broader
protection for fundamental rights. . . .”59 After careful analysis, the court
held that “barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and
53

28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000); see generally Strasser, supra note 3.
See Strasser, supra note 49, at 439. Strasser argues that DOMA is not merely defining who will
receive federal marriage benefits but instead is trying to modify state regulation of family law. Congress is
overstepping its authority if it attempts to define marriage to determine who qualifies for federal benefits
and allows states to define marriage for state purposes. The scope of a federal right is a federal question,
but its content still may be determined by state law. State law is especially important to apply “where a
[federal] statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
primarily a matter of state concern.” Id. (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)). But see
Koppelman, supra note 19, at 4 n.25. Koppelman asserts that “[o]nly the federal incidents of marriage are
withheld as a result of DOMA’s definition.” Id.
55
See Koppelman, supra note 19; Strasser, supra note 49; Emily J. Sack, The Retreat from DOMA:
The Public Policy of Same-Sex Marriage and a Theory of Congressional Power Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 507 (2005).
56
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp. 2d 1298 (2005). The United States District Court, M.D.
Florida, Tampa Division, dismissed plaintiff’s argument that the U.S. Supreme Court is “likely to declare
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right that is protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 1309. The
district court stated that it will not create such a fundamental right before the Supreme Court revisits the
issue of same-sex marriage and asserted that the higher courts have not acknowledged or established a
constitutional right to enter into same-sex marriage. Id. The district court also held that its role is to follow
precedent of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, not to overturn precedent by
striking down DOMA. Id.
57
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 313.
54
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obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”60
Because Congress currently has no authority to prohibit a state from
passing laws affecting same-sex marriage, the federal government cannot
pass legislation to stop Massachusetts from granting such marriages without
passing a constitutional amendment. DOMA does, however, allow other
states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages from Massachusetts. In
2005, a federal court in Florida upheld the State’s refusal to recognize a
Massachusetts marriage license.61 Even within Massachusetts, however, the
impact of DOMA on a same-sex married couple is harsh “since at a stroke it
deprives them of all the federal benefits to which other married couples are
entitled.”62 Under DOMA, same-sex spouses are unable to file federal joint
tax returns;63 are excluded from the federal employees’ health-benefits
program64 and the federal employees’ life-insurance program;65 are not
entitled as widows or widowers to compensation for the work-related death
of a federal employee;66 and are unable to receive spousal benefits under the
Social Security Act’s old age, survivors, and disability-insurance program.67
In 1997, the General Accounting Office found that over one thousand federal
laws contained benefits, rights, and privileges contingent on marital status.68
DOMA excludes same-sex couples from the protections and benefits of
these laws.69
On the other hand, same-sex married couples in Massachusetts are
eligible for marriage benefits that touch “nearly every aspect of life and
death.”70 In Massachusetts, marriage benefits include joint state income tax
filing;71 tenancy by the entirety, which provides protections against creditors
and allows for the automatic descent of property to the surviving spouse
without probate;72 automatic rights to inherit the property of a deceased
60

Id. at 344.
Wilson, 354 F.Supp. 2d at 1309. In this case, plaintiffs Nancy Wilson and Paula Schoenwether
claimed they were legally married in Massachusetts and possessed a valid marriage license. They allegedly
presented their marriage license to a deputy clerk of the circuit court, who refused to recognize it. Id. at
1301.
62
Koppelman, supra note 19, at 1.
63
Koppelman, supra note 19, at 3.
64
5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) (2000); Koppelman, supra note 19, at 3.
65
5 U.S.C. § 8701(d)(1)(a) (2000); Koppelman, supra note 19, at 3.
66
5 U.S.C. §§ 8101(6), (11)(2000); Koppelman, supra note 19, at 3.
67
42 U.S.C. § 416(a)(2004); Koppelman, supra note 19, at 4.
68
Sack, supra note 55, at 518 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act, Gen.
Accounting Office Rep. OCG-97-16, at 1 (1997)).
69
Sack, supra note 55, at 517.
70
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (2003).
71
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62c, § 6 (2001); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
72
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (1996); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
61
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spouse that does not leave a will;73 the right to share the medical policy of
one’s spouse;74 the right to bring claims for wrongful death and loss of
consortium resulting from tort actions;75 preferential options under the
state’s pension system;76 evidentiary rights such as the prohibition against
spouses testifying against one another;77 and the application of predictable
rules of child custody in the event of a divorce.78
These rights, however, do not encompass the totality of the benefits of
marriage.79 In 2004, the Massachusetts Senate sought an advisory opinion
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding a bill, Senate
No. 2175, drafted in response to Goodridge.80 The proposed law purported
to create an institution of civil unions for same-sex couples that would
provide all of the same “benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities”
granted to spouses in a marriage, yet be separate from it.81 Even with equal
protection of tangible benefits, however, the Supreme Judicial Court stated
that the bill maintained “an unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory
status for same-sex couples. . . .”82 While providing equal specific benefits,
“[t]he bill would have [had] the effect of maintaining and fostering a stigma
of exclusion that the [Massachusetts] Constitution prohibits.”83 According
to the Supreme Judicial Court, the right to participate in the institution of
civil marriage itself, along with its tangible and intangible protections and
benefits, exceeds the sum of individual benefits accrued through a civilunion law.84
B.

Under the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth Has Broader
Authority to Impose the Definition of Marriage upon the States

The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901 pursuant to
an act of British Parliament.85 The Australian Constitution, modeled in some
73

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (1994); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 108 (1997); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-56.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, §§ 1-2 (1986); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
76
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 12(2) (2001); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
77
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (2000); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
78
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 19, 20, 28, 30, 31 (2003); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
79
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571-72 (2004).
80
Id. at 566; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
81
Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 568.
82
Id. at 572.
83
Id. at 570.
84
Id. at 571. For more information on the debate as to whether domestic-partner legislation is equal
to same-sex marriage laws, see, e.g., Enrique A. Monagas, California’s Assembly Bill 205, The Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation Compromising the
Campaign for Marriage Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (2006).
85
Government and Legal Systems, Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest (2005).
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respects on the U.S. Constitution, vests the High Court of Australia with
jurisdiction over the commonwealth’s powers.86 The Australian Constitution
gives Parliament the power to make laws with respect to marriage.87
1.

Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament Has Greater Authority to Pass
Laws Regarding Marriage Than Does the U.S. Congress

The Commonwealth Parliament has greater authority than the U.S.
Congress to legislate in the area of marriage because the Australian
Constitution explicitly gives the Commonwealth Parliament the authority to
“make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
commonwealth with respect to: . . . [m]arriage.”88 In addition, a law at the
commonwealth level is binding upon states where state law conflicts with
the commonwealth’s law. Section 109 of the Australian Constitution states,
“[w]hen a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the commonwealth, the
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
invalid.”89
2.

The Scope of the Marriage Amendment Act in Australia is Broader
Than That of DOMA

In August 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia passed
the Marriage Amendment Act, which amended the Marriage Act 1961 in
several substantial respects.90 In section 5(1), the Marriage Amendment Act
inserted the text “[marriage] means the union of a man and a woman to the
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”91 In addition, at the
end of section 88B, the Amendment added “(4) To avoid doubt, in this Part
(including section 88E) marriage has the meaning given by subsection
5(1).”92 And lastly, after section 88E, the Amendment added “[c]ertain
unions are not marriages. A union solemnized in a foreign country between:
(a) a man and another man; or (b) a woman and another woman; must not be
[recognized] as a marriage in Australia.”93
Australian states that favor equality of benefits for same-sex couples
have other viable options for legal recognition under state law. For example,
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxi).
Id.
Austl. Const. § 109.
Marriage Amendment Act, 2004, No. 126, sched. 1 (Austl.).
Id. § 5(1).
Id. § 88(B).
Id. § 88(EA).
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in Tasmania, the Relationships Act gives registered same-sex couples status
equal to married couples under nearly all state laws, including property
transfers and state superannuation.94 In December 2005, the Australian
Capital Territory (“ACT”) announced that it was drafting legislation to
provide for civil unions in the territory.95 Jon Stanhope, chief minister of
ACT stated, “Civil unions will deliver real, functional equality under ACT
law for couples who either do not have access to the commonwealth
Marriage Act or who prefer not to marry.”96 The civil-union act would have
allowed same-sex couples to join in civil unions as freely as opposite-sex
couples, and would have resulted in the same legal recognition for partners
in civil unions as for married couples.97 However, while civil unions in the
ACT would have been available for all Australians, such unions would have
been valid only in the ACT and would not have affected national laws
governing taxation, superannuation, and health care.98
With such
understanding, the Civil Unions Act99 passed in the legislative assembly in
2006, giving formal recognition to same-sex partnerships.100 However, the
success of the Act was short lived; it was rejected by the governor-general
before the first same-sex couple entered into a civil union.101 “On June 13th
Michael Jeffrey, the governor-general, who represents Queen Elizabeth,
Australia’s head of state, rejected the law on [Prime Minister] Howard’s
advice. Mr. Howard argues the ACT’s law unacceptably equates gay civil
unions with marriage.”102 At the time of this comment’s publication, the
ACT government planned to revive “its plan to make same-sex unions legal
in the territory as the federal Government reassesses legal discrimination
against homosexuals.”103

94
Andrew Darby, Tasmania Accepts Same-sex Partners (Jan. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/01/02/1072908908416.html.
95
Press Release, Jon Stanhope, Chief Minister, Australian Capital Territory, ACT to Legislate for
Civil Unions (Dec. 2, 2005).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Perry, supra note 15.
99
Australian Capital Territory’s Civil Unions Act, A2006-22 (2006), repealed and never effective.
100
No Wedding Bells, supra note 15.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
ACT Revives Gay Union Plans, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,20629183,00.html.
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III.

THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA IS LIKELY TO FIND THAT THE
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT DOES NOT EXCEED PARLIAMENT’S
AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS WITH RESPECT TO MARRIAGE

If the Marriage Amendment Act is challenged, the High Court of
Australia is likely to find it was within the constitutional authority of
Parliament to pass the Marriage Amendment Act. On its face, it appears that
the constitutional analysis of the Marriage Amendment Act under Australian
law is more straightforward than the analysis of DOMA under the U.S.
Constitution. Marriage is one of the forty enumerated subjects on which the
commonwealth is authorized to legislate.104 Thus, it appears that it was
within the constitutional authority of Parliament to pass the Marriage
Amendment Act. However, statutory interpretation in Australia traditionally
required that words be interpreted according to their meaning at the time the
legislation was passed.105 Possibly, therefore, the interpretation of marriage
may be limited to what that word meant when the constitution was adopted
in 1900.106 Thus, it is arguable that Parliament cannot legislate on the topic
of same-sex marriage because the term marriage was not interpreted to
encompass same-sex marriage in 1900. If the word marriage in the
constitution refers only to heterosexual marriage, then same-sex marriages
could be authorized by state legislation.107 However, “the purpose of
granting power to the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to
marriage was to make possible uniform national regulation of a vitally
important legal relationship. . . .” It is difficult to predict how the High
Court may rule on same-sex marriage, in part because “High Court decisions
104

Austl. Const. § 51(xxi); George Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution 137

(1999).
105

Jeffry Goldsworthy, Constitutional Law: Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Century, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 667, 678 (2000) (stating that orthodox principles of statutory interpretation were applied
to the Australian Constitution for the first century after its adoption). Some legal authorities challenge this
method of interpretation. For example, see Honorable Justice Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation
and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship? 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (“When an old
line of authority is overturned, this may sometimes be explained not by reference to an error in the
perception of the Justices who propounded that authority at the time of its invention and first applications,
but rather by the fact that the eyes of new generations of Australians inevitably see the unchanged language
in a different light. The words remain the same. The meaning and content of the words take [color] from
the circumstances in which the words must be understood and to which they must be applied”).
106
Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 699. Goldsworthy indicates that one concern “about the
consequences of originalism is whether or not the Commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate for
same-sex marriage.” Id. One the one hand, “in 1900 the word ‘marriage’ meant a union of a man and a
woman—and this would almost certainly have been regarded as an essential part of the connotation, and
not merely the denotation, of the word.” Id. But on the other hand, “it is possible to make a respectable
argument consistent with originalism that leads to the opposite conclusion.” Id.
107
Id. at 700.
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on the express and implied rights in the Australian Constitution have been
neither consistent nor coherent.”108
This confusion and uncertainty led both New South Wales and
Tasmania to introduce same-sex marriage bills in their state legislatures
providing for marriage between adults of the same sex.109 Although the
Marriage Amendment Act was already in force, Tasmania introduced the
Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2005, Same-Sex Marriage (Celebrant and
Registration) Bill, and Same-Sex Marriage (Dissolution and Annulment) Bill
2005 on April 12, 2005.110 In New South Wales, legislation of the same title
was introduced into the Legislative Council on May 4, 2005.111
While there are convincing arguments both for and against upholding
the constitutionality of the Marriage Amendment Act, the High Court will
likely determine that Parliament does have the power to define marriage as
exclusively the union between a man and a woman, effectively prohibiting
same-sex marriage. However, the question is unresolved. The issue,
therefore, is determining, “on what side of the line does extending the
marriage power to same-sex marriages fall?”112
A.

Some Arguments Suggest the High Court Will Determine That the
Commonwealth Parliament Does Not Have the Authority to Pass
Laws Touching Upon Same-Sex Marriage

1.

Parliament Does Not Have the Authority to Define Constitutional
Terms.

Under Australian law, Parliament lacks authority to define terms
because no law can give power to any body, other than a court, to determine
conclusively any issue upon which the constitutional validity of the law
depends.113 This doctrine is often metaphorically described by the maxim
“the stream cannot rise above its source.”114 While the historic record
108

WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 227.
Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2005 (Tas).
110
Alex Bainbridge, Greens Introduce Bill for Same-Sex Marriage, GREEN LEFT WEEKLY (Apr. 20,
2005), available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2005/623/623p5d.htm; Cooper, supra note 15, at *3
n.3.
See also Parliament of Tasmania, Passage of Bills, http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/bills/
20_of_2005.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
111
Cooper, supra note 15, at *3 n.3.
112
Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 701. Goldsworthy, law professor at Monash University, argues
that same-sex marriage falls within the meaning of marriage in section 51, but warns that “[t]his purposive
argument is admittedly dangerously slippery.” Id.
113
Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 177 (1981).
114
GEOFFREY SAWER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM IN THE COURTS 116 (1967) (quoting Heiner v. Scott
(1914) 19 C.L.R. 381, 393; ZINES, supra note 113, at 177 (quoting Heiner, 19 C.L.R. at 393).
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implies that the constitution framers believed the High Court would possess
the final word on constitutional powers, no specific case points to this
authority.115
The decision in Australian Communist Party v.
Commonwealth116 is considered to be the closest to a declaration of such
power and, therefore, is arguably the Australian equivalent of Marbury v.
Madison117 in the United States.118 When a law is clearly within the
legislature’s authority, some Australian judges may allow the legislature
leeway in conferring power on public servants.119 However, when the
legislative power’s source is at issue, the courts must be concerned with the
separation of power between the commonwealth and the states; “similar
latitude should not be allowed to the Commonwealth Parliament or
government regarding determination of those questions.”120 As a result of
this doctrine, the Parliament does not have the authority to assert a
conclusive determination of constitutional law.121 Except during times of
war when laws have deference power, the constitutional validity of a law
cannot be made to depend upon the opinion of the Parliament.122 Thus, as
the court quipped in Communist Party,123 the “power to make laws with
respect to lighthouses does not authorize the making of a law with respect to
anything which is, in the opinion of the lawmaker, a lighthouse.”124
This interpretation of legislative authority could have a substantial
impact on any potential High Court decision on the constitutionality of the
Marriage Amendment Act. Like the lighthouse analogy, Parliament clearly
has the authority under section 51 (xxi) to make laws with respect to
marriage,125 but this does not mean that Parliament may make laws with
respect to anything that is, in the opinion of the lawmaker, a marriage. If the
High Court determined that the term marriage in the constitution referred to
a union between only a man and a woman, i.e., its traditional meaning at the
time the constitution was adopted, then the commonwealth Parliament
would have the authority to regulate only opposite-sex marriages.
Parliament would not, therefore, have the authority to pass a law either
allowing or prohibiting same-sex marriages. If this determination is made,
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 199.
Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 199.
ZINES, supra note 113, at 177.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178.
Id. (citing Communist Party, 83 C.L.R. 1).
Communist Party (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 258.
ZINES, supra note 113, at 178 (quoting Communist Party, 83 C.L.R. at 258).
AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxi).
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the Marriage Amendment Act will either be interpreted simply as providing
a partial definition of marriage that does not conflict with a state’s inclusion
of same-sex marriage or will be struck down entirely. In order to evaluate
this possibility, it is important to analyze the scope of the traditional
interpretation of marriage, as understood at the time the constitution was
written.
2.

Under the Orthodox Principles of Legal Interpretation, Parliament
May Only Have the Authority to Pass Laws on Marriage as It Was
Understood at the Time the Constitution was Written

While marriage is a subject of power granted to the commonwealth,126
“[a]ccording to the orthodox rules of [Australian] legal interpretation, the
meaning to be given to a term is that which it had at the date of the
enactment,”127 in this case, the 1900 constitution. Historically, the High
Court looked at the connotation of a term, which is equivalent to the essence
or nature of the meaning of the term.128 The specifics of a term may change
over time, for instance the term vehicle logically expanded to cover electric
cars or water jet-skis, even though these “vehicles” did not exist in 1900.
However, if the word vehicle suddenly became the term used to describe
drug paraphernalia, a provision in the constitution that discussed vehicles
would not automatically expand to use of illegal drugs.
[I]n the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or
connotations of its words should remain constant. We are not to
give words a meaning different from any meaning which they
could have borne in 1900. Law is to be accommodated to
changing facts. It is not to be changed as language changes.129
Therefore, in order for the High Court to “retain the confidence of the
Australian people . . . [it must not] travel beyond what the text and structure
of the Constitution can reasonably support.”130 Strict originalism is
motivated “by a proper respect for people in the present—namely, the
electors of Australia and their elected representatives, who, pursuant to
[section] 128 of the Constitution, have exclusive authority to change their
126

Id.
ZINES, supra note 113, at 15 (citing R v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41 at 68; King v. Jones (1972)
128 C.L.R. 221, 229; Bonser v. La Macchia (1969) 122 C.L.R. 177).
128
ZINES, supra note 113, at 15.
129
Id. (quoting R v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission); Ex parte Association
of Professional Engineers (1959) 107 C.L.R. 208, 267.
130
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 249 (quoting Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994)
182 C.L.R. 104, 197 (McHugh, J.).
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own Constitution.”131 The original meaning, therefore, must be the starting
point for current interpretation.
The principle of originalism could be applied to the High Court’s
determination whether Parliament has the authority to pass federal laws
regarding same-sex marriage. “In 1901, ‘marriage’ was seen as meaning a
voluntary union for life between one man and one woman to the exclusion of
all others.”132 This definition was offered in 1866 by Lord Penzance in Hyde
v. Hyde133 and accepted in Australia in 1901.134 If that interpretation of the
term was accepted today, it would deny Parliament the authority to legislate
regarding same-sex marriages, because same-sex marriage is outside the
scope of the term’s original meaning.135 As a corollary, if the connotation of
marriage in 1900 only encompassed opposite-sex couples, then Parliament
also does not have the authority to prohibit same-sex marriage. Only if the
constitutional marriage power extends to same-sex unions does Parliament
have the power to pass laws authorizing or denying same-sex marriage at all.
Ironically, in order to ban same-sex marriage, Parliament would need to
depend on the definition of marriage to include same-sex marriage.136
The High Court has not ruled directly on the topic of the definition of
marriage in the constitution in any detail.137 It is unclear “whether, for the
purpose of the constitution, marriage should be given the definition it had in
1901, when the constitution came into effect, or in 1961, when the Marriage
Act was passed, or whether it should have its contemporary, everyday
meaning.”138 The High Court judges’ opinions on the authority of
Parliament vary widely. Justice Brennan takes a view that it is “beyond the
powers of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for any other form of
marriage” besides that encompassed by the Hyde definition.139 At the other
extreme, Justice McHugh states “arguably marriage now means, or in the
131

Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 683.
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 553 (McHugh, J.).
133
Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130, 133 (as cited by Alastair Nicholson, The Legal
Regulation of Marriage, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 556, 558 (2005)).
134
Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 699. It is important to note, however, that not all Australian
scholars believe Lord Penzance’s definition was accurate even at the time he gave it. The mere fact that
contemporaneous law established civil divorce indicates that a marriage never truly was defined as a union
for life. Nicholson, supra note 133, at 558.
135
Dan Meagher, The Times Are They a-Changin’?─Can the Commonwealth Parliament Legislate
for Same Sex Marriages?, 17 AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. 1, 3 (2003).
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Monika Ciolek et al., Submission of the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties and the
University of New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Committee’s Inquiry into the Provisions of the Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill 2004, July 30, 2004,
at *8, available at http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/marriage%20bill%20submission.pdf.
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near future may mean, a voluntary union for life between two people to the
exclusion of others.”140
The Marriage Amendment Act defines marriage as between a man and
a woman but does not explicitly prohibit marriage as between same-sex
couples, perhaps unintentionally vacating the field of same-sex marriages. If
the High Court determines that the term marriage is confined to opposite-sex
couples, then Parliament would be unable to override any state legislation
authorizing same-sex marriage, because the commonwealth’s power would
not extend to the subject matter.141 If the commonwealth has the authority to
pass laws only with respect to opposite-sex marriages, section 109 (the
Australian equivalent to the U.S. Supremacy Clause142) will be inapplicable.
The commonwealth’s law prevails only “to the extent of the
inconsistency,”143 but if the commonwealth’s law addresses marriage
involving only opposite-sex couples, and states create additional categories
that also qualify as marriage, there is technically no inconsistency. This
leaves room for the states to choose whether to pass legislation on the
matter.144 A state law defining marriage between same-sex couples is
operative to all persons not covered by Parliament’s definition. If a state
attempted to legislate that marriage did not include opposite-sex couples,
then there would be a conflict between the state and commonwealth laws,
and the state law would be invalid. A state law, however, becomes
inoperative because of inconsistency only to the extent of that inconsistency.
If the High Court determines that Parliament is restricted to passing
laws regarding marriage exclusively with respect to unions between a man
and a woman, then the states should be able to pass supplementary
legislation further defining marriage as also a union between two people of
the same sex. Because the topic of marriage shares concurrent jurisdiction
with both the states and the commonwealth, a same-sex couple married
under a valid state law could be entitled to all of the privileges and
responsibilities of marriage throughout the commonwealth.145
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Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 553 (McHugh, J.) (emphasis in original);
Nicholson, supra note 133, at 563.
141
Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 700.
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Austl. Const. § 109.
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See P. H. Lane, Some Principles and Sources of Australian Constitutional Law 224 (1964).
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In the Alternative, Arguments Suggest the High Court Will Determine
That the Commonwealth Parliament Has the Authority to Pass a Law
Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage

While there are some arguments to suggest that the High Court may
find that Parliament did not have the authority to pass the Marriage
Amendment Act, it is more likely that the court will determine that
Parliament does possess the constitutional authority to legislate on matters
regarding same-sex marriage. Before Parliament enacted the Marriage
Amendment Act, same-sex marriage proponents in Australia persuasively
argued that the term marriage in section 51(xxi) of the constitution
encompasses same-sex marriage and therefore Parliament has the authority
to legalize same-sex marriage at the commonwealth level.146 It has been
argued that the constitution was “set completely free in 1901 from the
intentions, beliefs and wishes of those who drafted it so that it is viewed by
each succeeding generation of Australians with the eyes of their own
times.”147 That argument may now come back to haunt those proponents
because, if true, the logical extension of Parliament having the authority
under section 51(xxi) to legalize same-sex marriage is that Parliament may
also have the authority to prohibit it.148
Parliamentary powers listed in section 51 grant plenary powers which
are “to be construed with all the generality that its words will admit.”149 The
High Court has adopted a broad interpretation for construing the
commonwealth powers listed in section 51 of the constitution.150 Each of
146

See, e.g., Meagher, supra note 135, at *54-58.
Kirby, supra note 105, at 4. Justice Kirby has been said to advocate an “extreme and radical
version of non-originalism, which concedes almost no relevance at all to either the Constitution’s original
meaning or its founders’ intentions.” Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 679.
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term. Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 700. In 2003, a year before Parliament passed the Marriage
Amendment Act, Dan Meagher, a lecturer at the School of Law at Deakin University in Australia, argued
that as a constitutional term of art, the meaning of marriage as a union between a man and a woman was
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parliamentary response to a new and unforeseen social, technological, and economic circumstances.
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core interpretive principle. Meagher, supra note 135, at *54-58. See also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally
(1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 553 (McHugh, J.).
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the powers granted in section 51 “can support not only laws which operate
directly on the subject matter of the paragraph in question but also laws
which do not operate directly but which can be seen as incidental to the
power.”151 Legislative power “carries with it power to make laws governing
or affecting many matters that are incidental or ancillary to the subject
matter.”152 For example, in 1991, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the
Political Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1991,153 which introduced
Part IIID into the Broadcasting Act 1942.154 In Australian Capital Television
Proprietary Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, the plaintiffs sought
declarations that Part IIID was invalid.155 While the plaintiffs claimed
several constitutional violations, they accepted “that the legislative powers
conferred by [section] 51(v) with respect to ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic
and other like services’ . . . on the Parliament by the Constitution . . . would
support the Act.”156 Their concession is strong indication that section 51
powers are typically interpreted broadly. By similar measure, it is probable
that the High Court will interpret the term marriage broadly, as it also is a
section 51 plenary grant of power to Parliament. If construed generally, the
ability to prohibit same-sex marriage likely will be held to affect the subject
matter of marriage, and, therefore, be constitutional.
Even cases in which the High Court has held that Parliament exceeded
its section 51 authority give an indication that the Court likely will conclude
that the Marriage Amendment Act did not exceed that scope. The close
decision in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner provides an example.157 At that
time, the Industrial Relations Act 1988 allowed a party to a contract to make
an application to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to review
the contract to determine if it was unfair, harsh, or against the public’s
interest.158 The law applied only to contracts that related to “constitutional
corporations.”159 Parliament based its authority to pass such a law on
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section 51(xx) of the constitution,160 which gives the commonwealth the
power to make laws with respect to “foreign corporations, and trading or
financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth.”
Four justices of the High Court (Justices Brennan, Dawson, McHugh, and
Toohey) determined that sections of the Industrial Relations Act 1988
exceeded the section 51(xx) authority of Parliament to pass such a law.
Declaring that when a law is too broad it is invalid, Justice Brennan asserted
that the legislative power conferred by section 51(xx) does not extend to
things relating to corporations, but instead it confers on the Parliament only
a power to legislate with respect to the matters enumerated in the section.161
Justice Toohey declared, “[t]he words ‘with respect to’ require a ‘relevance
to or connection with the subject assigned to the Commonwealth
Parliament.’”162 Justice Dawson, however, pointed out that section 51(xx) is
different from most of the other paragraphs in section 51, as it “describes the
subject matter of the legislative power which it confers by reference to
categories of persons, albeit artificial persons, [and therefore] a different
approach is required in determining whether a law falls within its terms.”163
Justice Dawson uses the example of a law directed at interstate trade and
commerce: “For example, a law directed at interstate trade and commerce
will be a law upon that subject and so fall within [section] 51(i). But a law
directed at trading or financial corporations . . . is not necessarily a law upon
the subject matter of those bodies.”164 Further, Justice McHugh, concerned
with Parliament legislating outside the scope of the subject matter on which
it is are authorized to legislate, noted that “as long as the law in question can
be characterized as a law with respect to trading, financial or foreign
corporations, the Parliament of the Commonwealth may regulate many
subject matters that are otherwise outside the scope of Commonwealth
legislative power.”165 Three justices (Justices Deane, Gaudron, and Chief
Justice Mason), on the other hand, asserted that the law did not exceed
Parliament’s authority.166
The fact that the High Court determined that Parliament did not have
the authority to pass such a law initially appears to support the argument that
the court also may not uphold the Marriage Amendment Act because the
court interpreted Parliament’s authority to pass commonwealth legislation
160
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165
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Id. at 339.
Id. at 352 (quoting Grannall v. Marrickville Margarine Proprietary Ltd. (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55, 77).
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narrowly. However, section 51(xxi) of the constitution, which gives
Parliament the power to make laws with respect to marriage, is more similar
to Dawson’s example of interstate trade and commerce. Marriage is a
subject matter over which Parliament has the authority to pass laws. The
power is not granted to Parliament by reference to, for instance, married
persons. The Marriage Amendment Act clearly impacts the subject matter of
marriage. By allowing Parliament to pass a law eliminating same-sex
marriage, there is no concern that it is regulating a subject matter outside the
scope of its initial authority. The ultimate question is whether there is “a
sufficient connection between the law and the subject matter to be able to
say that the law is one with respect to that subject matter.”167 A law defining
the scope of marriage clearly is one with respect to the subject matter of
marriage.
Overall, section 51 powers are plenary grants to Parliament and are
interpreted broadly. A commonwealth law is likely to be upheld if it
addresses the subject matter of an entity the constitution explicitly bestowed
authority upon Parliament to regulate.
IV.

THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT, IF VALID, WILL LIKELY TRUMP ANY
STATE OR TERRITORY LAW THAT ALLOWS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

If the High Court determines that Parliament possesses the authority
to pass the Marriage Amendment Act, the court is likely to find that the
legislation supersedes any contradictory state law. However, there are at
least two opposing arguments regarding an Australian state’s authority to
enact its own same-sex marriage law since the passage of the Marriage
Amendment Act.
One argument is that under the Marriage Amendment Act, states have
no authority at all to pass same-sex marriage laws.168 Under this theory, if
Tasmania and New South Wales (or any other state) passed bills legalizing
same-sex marriage at the state level, those laws either would have little or no
impact upon existing marriage laws, or would be struck down by the High
Court as conflicting with commonwealth law.169
167
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The second argument is that the Marriage Amendment Act “made
crystal clear that federal marriage law deals only with different-sex
marriage, [and therefore] the states are now free to pass constitutionally
valid laws for same-sex marriage.”170 Proponents of this theory assert that
Australia’s Marriage Amendment Act should be interpreted in a similar way
to DOMA in the United States; the federal legislation would regulate
marriage only with respect to federal benefits, but state same-sex marriage
laws would operate in a different and mutually exclusive field.171 If the
Commonwealth Parliament does not execute or possess the authority to pass
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, then the field of same-sex marriage is
left wide open to the states.
Commonwealth Parliament would be unable to override or
modify such legislation, since ex hypothesi, its power would not
extend to the subject matter. The word “marriage” would then
have two different meanings in Australian law: its meaning in
the Constitution, confined to heterosexual marriage, and a
broader meaning defined partly by State legislation.172
Therefore, it is possible that the High Court would uphold the
constitutionality of the Marriage Amendment Act but still allow states to
enact legislation defining marriage with a broader meaning than is indicated
in the commonwealth legislation.
However, presuming that the Marriage Amendment Act is upheld
constitutionally, the High Court will likely agree with the first argument;
under the Marriage Amendment Act, states have no authority to pass
contradictory same-sex marriage laws. Section 109 of the constitution will
be invoked to invalidate any state law that violates Parliament’s intention to

given that Tasmania has comprehensively legislated under the Relational Act 2003 (Tas) to regulate samesex unions, the Labor government, supported by the Liberal opposition, has made clear that it is
unconvinced that same-sex couples have anything to gain as a matter of law in the reforms proposed.”
(internal citations omitted) Id.
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Rodney Croome, Marching Under the Banner of Marriage, GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, May 11, 2005,
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2005/626/626p10.htm. According to Rodney Croome’s article, George
Williams, an Australian constitutional law scholar whom I cite to many times in this Comment, stated that
he believed that State same-sex marriage laws would occupy a different field than the federal legislation,
and therefore would likely be upheld by the High Court. In reference to the Marriage Amendment Act,
Croome quotes Williams as saying, “An analogy can be drawn with the approach taken by the High Court
to whether a federal industrial award overrides a state award. The court has held that, where a federal
award makes no provision on a particular matter, a state award may be able to operate on that matter
without being overridden under [section] 109.” Id.
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cover the field and be the exclusive source of law on the topic of defining
marriage.
A.

Section 109 of the Constitution Allows for Broad Commonwealth
Authority

If Parliament exercises its power to legislate on matters regarding
marriage, then section 109 of the constitution demands that such federal
legislation supersede any conflicting state legislation. “States retain
legislative power in those subject matters not expressly granted to the
Commonwealth Parliament by [section] 51. [Furthermore, section] 51(xxi) is
a concurrent power meaning that the States as well as the Commonwealth
have legislative power with respect to ‘marriage.’”173 If the commonwealth
law has not occupied the field, a state law possibly would control not only in
that state, but could bind the commonwealth to recognize same-sex
marriages from that state as well.
On the other hand, where federal legislation is inconsistent with state
legislation, it renders the state legislation invalid, in accordance with section
109 of the constitution.174 “‘Invalid,’ in this context, means ‘inoperative’
rather than void, meaning that inconsistent state legislation is revived if the
overriding Commonwealth legislation is repealed.”175 However, it is beyond
the powers of a state or territory “to enact laws, or to cause laws to operate,
in a manner inconsistent with or repugnant to the laws of the paramount
legislature.”176
Section 109 has been interpreted broadly by the High Court in favor
of commonwealth legislation. State legislation will be deemed inconsistent
and inoperative if (1) “it is impossible to obey both laws,” (2) “if one law
purports to confer a legal right, privilege, or entitlement that the other law
purports to take away or diminish . . . ,” or (3) “if the Commonwealth law
shows a legislative intention to ‘cover the field’ [or] . . . be all the law there
is on that topic.”177

173

Meagher, supra note 135, at 5, n.9 (citing Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 700).
Viskauskas v. Niland (1983) 153 C.L.R. 280.
175
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 12 (citing Carter v. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic)
(1942) 66 C.L.R. 557, 573).
176
See Attorney General (NT) v. Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 25 F.C.R. 345, 367.
177
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 12.
174

162

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

B.

VOL. 16 NO. 1

Parliament Intended to Cover Marriage as a Matter Subject to
Commonwealth Authority

If one closely examines the language of the Australian amendment, it
becomes clear that Parliament did not in fact specifically ban same-sex
marriage. The exact wording of the added provision in question reads,
“marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all
others, voluntarily entered into for life.”178 The phrase “to the exclusion of
all others” is not set off from “the union of a man and a woman” by a
comma and does not contain the word only. Its plain meaning is that
marriage is a union between a man and a woman and no other third party.
“To the exclusion of all others” specifically applies to the union being
between only two people. The phrase does not refer back independently to
the definition of marriage and therefore does not define marriage as being
restricted to a heterosexual couple. Unlike the language in the United States’
DOMA, which clearly stated that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,”179 the
Australian law makes no such assertion that a union between a man and a
woman is the only acceptable meaning. Therefore, if a state passed
legislation legalizing same-sex marriage, it technically would not be
impossible to obey both laws. The High Court could interpret that a
marriage between two men does not violate the commonwealth definition, as
there is no indication that marriage can only be defined narrowly.
On the other hand, it is clear that Parliament had an intention to cover
the field with the addition of specific language defining marriage. The
Marriage Act 1961 was fully functional and operational prior to the
Amendment in 2004, which sought only to limit the definition of marriage to
cover unions between a man and a woman. The existence of the amendment
itself is strong indication of Parliament’s intent. The provisions added to the
Marriage Amendment Act that expressly prohibit recognition of same-sex
marriages solemnized in other nations is an indication that Parliament
intended to prohibit any same-sex marriage solemnized in Australia as well.
The Commonwealth’s legislative intention to cover the field gives strong
indication that the High Court will determine that section 109 applies; any
state laws that attempt to define marriage as other than between a man and a
woman will be invalidated.
The High Court has dealt with the issue of ascertaining the precise
limits of the field that the commonwealth legislation intended to cover. In
178
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Viskauskas v. Niland,180 the court considered a suit that was brought in New
South Wales arising from an incident in which three persons were allegedly
refused service in a hotel bar on the grounds of their race.181 The
complainants alleged unlawful discrimination based on race, in violation of
the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.182 The commonwealth,
however, also had legislation covering the same issue in the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975.183 In ruling that the section 109 of the constitution
invalidates the sections of the New South Wales Act that are inconsistent
with the commonwealth act, the court stated that the commonwealth cannot
“admit the possibility that a State law might allow exceptions to the
prohibitions of racial discrimination or might otherwise detract from the
efficacy of the Commonwealth law.”184 The Racial Discrimination Act 1975
“deals with the subject of racial discrimination.”185 As such, the state
antidiscrimination act was inoperable.
By similar measure, the Marriage Amendment Act deals with the
subject of marriage. It is therefore likely that the High Court will use similar
reasoning to conclude that any state legislation that attempts to undermine
the commonwealth’s Act will be declared invalid by section 109. Thus, if a
state’s same-sex marriage law interferes with or allows exception to the
commonwealth’s Marriage Amendment Act, and the Act is within
Parliamentary authority, then state legislation allowing same-sex marriage
likely would not stand.
V.

PROPONENTS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA SHOULD NOT
ATTEMPT TO PASS STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS, BUT INSTEAD
SHOULD PRESS FOR CIVIL UNIONS AND DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS

Proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia should use a different
tactical approach than proponents in the United States. In the United States,
proponents of same-sex marriage can advocate for state same-sex marriage
laws without fear of triggering a Supreme Court decision holding that
DOMA preempts state law. Even though DOMA defines marriage as a
union between a man and a woman, it applies exclusively to acts of
Congress. Therefore, a state law defining marriage as a union between two
people does not technically conflict with DOMA.
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In Australia, on the other hand, the scope of Parliament’s authority to
define marriage under the Marriage Amendment Act is uncertain. Because
the constitution authorizes Parliament to pass laws with respect to marriage,
arguably a commonwealth law defining marriage as a union between a man
and a woman binds the states as well.
As discussed above, in 2005, legislation providing for same-sex
marriage was introduced in both New South Wales and Tasmania.186
Undoubtedly, proponents of this legislation are in favor of same-sex
marriage. While pushing for state same-sex marriage is an effective way to
change public perception in the United States, it is a dangerous approach for
advocates of same-sex marriage in Australia.
Australian state laws authorizing same-sex marriage arguably will
conflict with the Marriage Amendment Act. In hearing a case regarding this
conflict, the High Court is likely to determine that Parliament does have the
authority to pass legislation on the subject of same-sex marriage. If it finds a
conflict, therefore, the High Court will likely invalidate the state legislation.
This action would leave Australians without the ability to enact same-sex
marriage laws at the state level.
Proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia may argue that by not
pushing forward with state same-sex marriage laws, they are conceding in
advance that the High Court will rule against them. However, a decision by
the High Court adverse to their position may be more damaging than just the
prevention of same-sex marriage.
Currently, there is no serious
commonwealth opposition to state de facto relationships. However, Prime
Minister Howard expressed his dissatisfaction with any recognition of samesex partnerships.187 The commonwealth’s interjection into the ACT
government’s attempt to pass a civil-union law188 indicates that states may
be bound by federal definitions. If advocates of same-sex marriage were to
force a decision before the High Court and lose, the loss might propel
opponents of same-sex marriage to enact even stronger commonwealth
legislation prohibiting rights for same-sex couples. If the High Court
extends the definition of marriage to include same-sex marriage, it could
extend the definition of marriage to include all marriage-like entities. If that
happened, the Commonwealth Parliament could have the authority not only
to prohibit states from passing same-sex marriage laws, but also could
prohibit states from allowing civil unions or de facto partnerships.
186
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As a result of the uncertain scope of Parliament’s authority to pass
laws regarding marriage, supporters of same-sex marriage in Australia
should proceed carefully. A decision unfavorable to their position by the
High Court likely would cripple their efforts to promote equality of benefits
for same-sex couples. However, currently, there is little opposition to states
passing laws granting equal tangible state benefits. At this point, therefore,
instead of pushing for state same-sex marriage laws, Australians in favor of
same-sex marriage should promote alternatives to same-sex marriage. With
a change in public perception, advocates may be able to convince Parliament
to amend or repeal the Marriage Amendment Act. A direct challenge,
however, could be detrimental to the efforts to legalize marriage as a union
between two people.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Marriage Amendment Act in Australia and the DOMA in the
United States both define marriage as a union between a man and a woman.
In the United States, this definition clearly extends only to marriage for
federal purposes. States, such as Massachusetts, have the power to enact
same-sex marriage laws and to confer all of the state benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples. In Australia, however, the constitution gives Parliament
express authority to pass laws on the subject of marriage. Arguably, this
means that Australian states and territories are precluded from passing samesex marriage laws. If the High Court of Australia upholds the authority of
Parliament to prohibit all same-sex marriages, opponents of same-sex
marriage may encourage Parliament to pass even greater restrictions for
same-sex couples in Australia. Proponents of same-sex marriage, therefore,
should not push for state same-sex marriage laws like those that have been
introduced in Tasmania and New South Wales. A direct state/commonwealth
conflict of laws may trigger a High Court decision upholding the
commonwealth’s authority to bind states to a scheme that embraces only
opposite-sex marriage.
In order to achieve full marriage equality,
Australians need to first change public perception through the passage of
state civil unions and eventually lobby to convince Parliament to authorize
same-sex marriage through commonwealth legislation.

